Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66

[jconners]

The Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66 was awarded two Presidential Unit Citations for extraordinary heroism for their participation in the Battles of the Ia Drang (November 1965) and Nathan Hale (June 1966); conducted the historic FIRST night combat rappel lead by RANGER Lawson; and performed DOD/MACV directed long range reconnaissance (LRRP) operations lead by 101st RECONDO Grimes along the northern Cambodia and southern Laos borders in the spring of 1966..."Laying Down FIRST Tracks in the Central Highlands".

[jconners]

Combat/Reconnaissance Patrol of the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav during Operation Nathan Hale June 23, 1966

On July 19, 1966 the 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Inf, 101st Airborne Division conducted air assaults northwest of Tuy Hoa in the vicinity of Trung Luong Valley and encountered heavy resistance and casualties from battles with the 66th, 95th and 18th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army 302d Division. B and C Companies of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Cav Division were inserted to reinforce the 2/327 Inf on June 20. B Co 1/8th Cav linked up with B Co 2/327 Inf in the morning on June 21 in the vicinity of LZ Eagle. The two airborne battalions experienced continuous attacks, including hand-to-hand combat, and inflicted heavy losses on the two NVA attacking battalions. One wounded NVA company commander was captured from the area in front of the rifle companies and reported his unit had been annihilated and the other NVA units had begun to withdraw on the evening of June 22d.

On June 22, Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav (Chinese Bandits) were extracted from reconnaissance operations being performed in Kontum Province and airlifted to Tuy Hoa airport and placed under the operational control of the 1st Bn 9th Cav, 1st Cav Division. At 0530, 23 June, the Chinese Bandits Recon Platoon and one Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav were inserted into separate landing zones southwest of LZ Eagle to regain contact with the one of the withdrawing NVA forces. The sun was shining and the weather dry and combat engagement was anticipated so the ranger patrol caps were stowed and helmets donned as the Bandits approached and then exited the helicopters on the tree lined hilltop LZ. Both landing zones were located adjacent to wide, ox cart size, trails that led to the higher hilltops where several hundred of the NVA 66th Regiment were believed to be occupying. The Bandit LZ was located along the ridgeline approaching the expected enemy position and the 1/9th Recon LZ was located further downhill in a draw on the Bandit’s left flank.

The Bandits moved along the ridgeline trail and at mid-morning, point man PFC Raymond Carley observed a NVA size squad moving towards them and away from the 1/9th Recon Platoon that was proceeding along the lower trail towards the intersection of both trails. Carley and three others moved into a position ahead in the vicinity of coordinates CQ 958626 where they were able to kill three of the fleeing NVA before the remaining NVA, wearing khaki uniforms and some tan helmets, retreated further uphill.

The Bandits continued up hill along the trail with Carley now opting to carry the new AK47 that he had removed from one of the NVA and having given his own M16 and ammunition to the medic assigned to Recon. Anticipating a main NVA force to be occupying the intersection of the trails being used by the Bandits and the 1/9th Recon Platoon, the 25 man Chinese Bandit force advanced slowly along both sides of the trail while listening to the voices and sounds of the NVA preparing positions along the ridgeline ahead. Carley continued uphill ahead of the other Bandits until he located the first enemy positions and machinegun along the left side of the trail where the Bandits began to move into combat positions amongst the small and sparsely treed locations below the NVA. A second machinegun position was located on the right side of the trail and moments later a third NVA machinegun opened fire and the Bandits exchanged small arms fire (rifle, machinegun, and grenades) for several minutes as they attempted to advance and attack the NVA force.

Operating without orders, SP/4 Frank Spickler, team leader of the 3d Scout Squad, immediately ran forward to assist Carley and those engaging the most concentrated NVA force located in the vicinity of coordinates CQ 962618 where he observed Carley laying along the trail about 30 feet in front of the nearest NVA position. Carley had been shot several times and although alive, he was unable to crawl clear of the withering fire. Spickler moved closer and avoided detection by the NVA until he attempted to cross the trail and pull Carley to safety. Heavy enemy fire prevented Spickler from advancing and he withdrew a short distance to obtain the assistance of other Bandits located near him. Spickler positioned one of the scouts in a location where the scout could provide suppressing fire during his effort to move Carley. Leaving his rifle with the other Bandits, Spickler again moved into position near Carley, he dashed towards him, dropping to a low craw when the NVA fired on him and then rolling near Carley, he was able to hoist Carley on his back and quickly dragged him towards the side of the trail. During this attempt, Spickler felt the impact of bullets entering Carley. Once clear of the most intense fire, Spickler carried Carley to the medic who was already treating several, but less wounded Bandits.

During his second attempt to retrieve Carley, Spickler had located SGT James Lester lying less than ten feet from where Carley had been laying. Again acting without orders, Spickler returned to the area in front of the enemy’s position where he low crawled under fire and dragged the much heavier Lester clear of direct enemy fire.

The Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav had quickly advanced along the wide trail located in the draw and came alongside the left flank of the Chinese Bandits, where both Recon Platoons unsuccessfully attempted a coordinated attack in an effort to over run the NVA positions located near the intersection of both trails.

MSG Johnson, acting platoon leader of the Chinese Bandits, directed Spickler to move forward to a position between the lead scouts and the NVA and mark the position with smoke grenades. All available indirect fire mortars and artillery were positioned to support the other elements of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and the 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Inf and only ARA equipped gunships were able to provide supporting fires. Spickler remained in position, marking the enemy lines while the gunships continually attacked the NVA located in front of the two Recon Platoons and on the higher hilltops for about thirty minutes. One gunship pass was made ‘danger close’ resulting in a 2.75-inch FF aerial rocket exploding and injury several Bandits, including SSG Robert Grimes, the 1st Scout Squad Leader and acting Platoon Sergeant.

The NVA withdrew further uphill allowing the two Recon Platoons to carry their killed and wounded scouts along the side of the lower trail that had been used by the Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav. However, as darkness fell, another large NVA force resumed the attack and pursued the wounded men of both Recon Platoons as they made their way towards the LZ designated for extraction. Small firefights occurred throughout the night resulting in further Bandits being wounded. Approaching the LZ that was secured by other troops from the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division, in the early morning light, medivac helicopters arrived and both Recon Platoons were airlifted to a field medical station that had been located along Highway One. The bodies of Chinese Bandits PFC Raymond Carley and Sergeants James Lester and Honorio Ramirez and the other many wounded Bandits were left with the medics, doctors and nurses. The remaining Chinese Bandits rejoined the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and commenced patrolling in the area SW of LZ Eagle on June 26, 1966.

This description of the actions taken by Carley and Spickler is only one of the many efforts made by the scouts of both Recon Platoons and warrant being written in recognition of those that fought that day on June 23, 1966. Efforts are underway to post the other detailed descriptions of those engagements on the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav homepage.

Raymond Carley, our youngest Chinese Bandit, is buried at Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery in San Diego County, California; Frank Spickler was awarded the Bronze Star with V Device (something that remains a source of irritation after forty years…it was initially discussed that he was to be given the Distinguished Service Cross); and Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav was awarded its SECOND Presidential Unit Citation for valor. 101st Recondo Spickler was later shot in the lung while serving as the Platoon Sergeant of the 3d Platoon, C Company, 2d Bn (ABN) 501st Infantry, 101st Airborne Division and unable to remain on jump status and left the military in 1970.

The 1965-66 Chinese Bandits were to remain a fighting airborne Recon Platoon with its LRRP Team performing extended long range reconnaissance operations along the borders of Laos and Cambodia until November 1966 when they were disbanded having lost most of its original NCOs and scouts.

Extracted from written statement made by Duke Barrett and interviews with Frank Spickler and others serving with the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav on June 23, 1966; and the official after action reports of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, and 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Infantry.

Historical footnote: Nathan Hale (June 6, 1755 – September 22, 1776) was a captain in the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. Hale is best remembered for his “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country” speech before being hung following the Battle of Long Island. An account of his capture was written by Consider Tiffany, a British Loyalist, and obtained by the Library of Congress. In Tiffany’s account, Major Robert Rogers of the Queens Rangers (“Rogers Rangers”) was the individual responsible for his capture and personally apprehended him. More information can be obtained reference Nathan Hale’s capture in the Library of Congress Information Bulletin-July-August 2003 on line.

[jconners]

SPRING 1966 LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (LRRP) by RANGER Jerry Conners (Chinese Bandit 13)
A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was formed from members of the 1st
Bn (ABN) 8th Cav Recon platoon and attached to division headquarters
in the spring of 1966 as directed by the Department of Defense where
seven LRRP teams from the US Army Special Forces, US Marine Corps,
Navy and other Army units were established to conduct simultaneous
patrols within the Republic of Vietnam.

The Chinese Bandit six man team members were SSG Robert Grimes
(Acting Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon), SGT Jerry Conners,
Keijo Hyvonen, Frank Bishop, Louis Tyler, and Terry Stevens. The
first long range patrol was conducted along a 75 mile route adjacent
to the Cambodian and Laotian borders for a period of twelve days and
was performed while the other DOD directed teams performed LRRP
patrols in other portions of Vietnam. The major objective of the
patrol was to locate North Vietnamese positions that had been
reported along the border and to obtain specific essential elements
of information that included descriptions of the enemy's uniforms,
weapons, communication and other equipment and the presence of any
Caucasian personnel.

We wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle
fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues and 'tiger
fatigues'. All members wore patrol caps, LBE with two canteens, two
ammo pouches containing four magazines each, one butt pack and
carried M-16 rifles (taped with slings removed) with bayonets. Two
members of the patrol also wore NVA captured rucksacks. Only one 35mm
camera and two sets of binoculars and one small IR device were
carried. The first LRRP rations were issued and each member carried
six after removing the outer package and discarding everything except
the main dehydrated meal. We intended to only eat one meal every
other day and our diet was supplemented by a variety of foods
including `jungle chocolate candy bars'. Only one PRC-25 radio was
carried; however, a vertical half-rhombic antenna was assembled in
addition to the two other standard antennas. Only one SOI was carried
and used to prepare the coded daily reports what were transmitted. No
fragmentation grenades were carried and only two smoke grenades, one
by both Grimes and myself. I carried the only signal mirror and a
single VS17 air panel to assist in any emergency extraction. Several
of us wore the 101st Recondo School taped soap dish containing
sutures, morphine and other emergency medical items secured to our
LBE harness. All members of the patrol had a wound piece of `550
chord' secured to our harness with a 2000 pound tensile strength snap
link.

SSG Grimes and I drove a jeep to Division G-2 where captured NVA
equipment was stacked in front of the entrance. We were given a
briefing that included descriptions of the area we were to patrol and
the locations of suspected NVA regimental CPs. We were instructed to
recommend and plot our routes and request for pre-arranged fire
support after Grimes completed his low aerial reconnaissance of the
area in an OH-13. Grimes and I returned to the Battalion area and
tentatively selected the routes and observation points from the
supplied topographic maps and aerial photographs. We gave the LRRP
patrol members a warning order prior to Grimes performing the
reconnaissance flight. Upon his return we discussed what he had
observed and updated our information on the area but did not alter
our intended routes. The entire patrol participated in the
preparation of the operations order that was later given by SSG
Grimes. There were no rehearsals performed and the time prior to
departure was spent studying maps and checking equipment.

We were inserted about two hours before nightfall using one UH-1 that
made only one descent and hover for unloading located near an active
and believed to be safe farming area located about 2.5 km east of the
area where we would be operating. The actual LZ was located north of
the area at coordinates 48PYA554597 and this area had been evaluated
for enemy activity during Grimes' observation flight and by the low
level photo reconnnaissance performed by the Air Force. No enemy
contact was anticipated and none were encountered. We moved rapidly
into the tree-covered mountains at the southern limit of the patrol
area and proceeded northward along the border and through the night
to our first observation and study area (hilltop 847) and arrived
prior to BMAT. We had previously conducted numerous three day
patrols, including those along the Cambodia border, where we had
located and cleared a NVA Regimental CP and hospital; however the
terrain had not been as steep but our navigation skills and physical
conditioning enabled us to move quickly.

Movement, consisting of rapidly walking (routinely 3 km/hour)point to
point routes for approximately 18 hours, was intended to be limited
to late evening and night navigation with daily situation reports
made in the early morning to airborne Air Force aircraft from
positions selected on mountain tops that afforded the opportunity to
observe long distances. Rising smoke from what was believed to be
cooking fires was plotted on the topographic maps that we carried;
however, the planned patrol route was not altered and these sightings
were not evaluated from close range. We remained on well-worn and
narrow trails during most of the movements between observation
points. We did not expect the enemy to establish ambush sites or set
out mines and booby traps in these areas that were believed to be
only occupied by NVA troops. On several occasions we discovered enemy
boot prints at stream and trail junctions but not along the trail
routes that we were following. We wore issued jungle boots and
altered our routes to avoid trails having damp and soft surfaces
where our boots would have made an impression in the soil. This was
difficult to achieve during night movement but when I checked our
trail when doubling back during temporary halts, we managed to do
well at leaving no signs of our passing.

After about a week of patrolling, an emergency extraction was
necessary when Tyler became unconscious with a malaria fever. At the
risk of compromising our location, we requested a single UH-1 to a
small tree lined hilltop where we used a rope hoist secured to
Tyler's snap link to lift him from a large rock outcropping to the
skids of the hovering helicopter where the crew were able to grab and
lift him onboard. After the aircraft departed, we moved quickly along
a narrow trail down to a valley and up to another mountain ridge
where we `lay-dogged' until nightfall and then resumed our patrol as
planned.

We were able to zig-sag along our planned routes and complete the
daily observation reports from the pre-selected observation points.
Close enemy observation was only made on the last day of the patrol
where we were to be extracted by two UH-1s from an area located in
the northern limits of the patrol area. Eight NVA were found
gathering firewood with their rifles leaning against one tree. That
encounter will be described in a separate writing.

We were extracted by two UH-1s from a LZ that we had occupied for
the entire morning. The areas and trails leading into the LZ were
reconned by different team members and we were certain that no enemy
troops were within several miles of the LZ. The UH-1s arrived mid-day
and on time and we dove aboard the helicopters and returned to base
camp where we requested and were given ice cream, milk and different
meals while we prepared our combined de-briefing report that was
given by Grimes to G-2 and other division staff late that afternoon.
No other LRRP members accompanied him. When he returned, he informed
us that everyone was surprised that we had not become lost since the
other six teams had more difficulty navigating. When he and I were
alone, he asked, "Would you like to dye your skin brown, put on black
pajamas and parachute into North Vietnam?" "We have a chance to be
the first `Sting-Ray' team.

[Vladimir80]

How you have Chinese unit in US Army?

[Oriellien]

How you have Chinese unit in US Army?

The military was desegregated in 1948, so this was something done in Vietnam. Im guessing it was created to make a squad/platoon that could blend in with the population, but definatly not for segregation.