Sinosphere
09-11-2007, 12:38 PM
DAMASCUS - During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israel developed a regular habit of violating Syrian airspace to deter the Syrians from supporting the Egyptian army. The Syrians did not have radar at the time, so air force commander Wadih al-Muqabari developed a scheme whereby police stations around the country were linked by a 24-hour hotline to army headquarters in Damascus.
On spotting an Israeli warplane in Syrian skies, police personnel would phone their superiors and report its direction, elevation and estimated speed. Army headquarters would immediately call the nearest police station to track it further, then send Syrian warplanes to bring it down or chase it away.
On one such occasion, five Syrian aircraft set out for an operation that included a young pilot, future president Hafez al-Assad. They were prevented from bringing down the Israeli plane, although Assad had it in shooting range, because it was flying over Turkish territory. The same plane violated Syrian airspace later in the day. Another five-plane team set out, and the Israeli jet was downed on the Lebanese border by an officer named Louis Dakar. The pilot ejected, and the co-pilot was killed. When interrogated by the Lebanese, the Israeli pilot said there was a 1% chance of his plane being downed by the Syrians. The fact that they had succeeded meant that the Syrian army was "dangerous" for Israel.
That was 51 years ago.
Last week, four Israeli warplanes invaded Syrian airspace after midnight on September 6, breaking the sound barrier, and reaching as far as the village of Tal Abyad in the vicinity of Deir al-Zour, about 160 kilometers north of the city of Raqqa. A military source in Syria was quoted saying that the Israelis violated Syrian airspace "through the southern border, coming from the Mediterranean front toward the northeastern one".
Syrian defenses confronted the Israeli planes, forcing them to drop their fuel and ammunition so they could fly higher and faster and escape. "We warn the Israeli enemy government against this flagrant aggressive act, and retain the right to respond in an appropriate way," the military spokesman said. Witnesses reported seeing the warplanes at about 1:30am, but thought they were US ones, not Israeli.
The news caused a stir around the world, although it was pretty much expected by observers of the Syrian-Israeli front. There has been much speculation about an outbreak of hostilities between Damascus and Jerusalem since June. Both countries had been mobilizing troops, raising the prospects of war, until Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak came out one week before the military operation saying his country was going to withdraw its troops from the Golan border. Israel captured the Golan Heights in 1967 in the Six Day War and, since then, the countries have been in bitter dispute.
War was not an option, the Israeli minister seemed to be saying. He added that mobilization raised the risk of an "accidental incident" between both armies, something that Jerusalem wanted to avoid. For their part, the Syrians have been saying that their strategic choice is peace - not war - with Israel, reminding the world on every possible occasion that they had engaged in the peace process, under US auspices, for 15 years.
If both countries want peace, as the official version implies, then what exactly happened on September 6? One theory says Israel wanted to test Syrian defenses, especially after reports that Damascus had received new ballistic missiles from Russia. The objectives of the intrusion would be to "feel the waters" before Israel actually engaged in war with the Syrians. This was seconded by Israeli counter-terrorism expert Boaz Ganor, who said his country was "collecting intelligence on long-range missiles" deployed by Syria in the north.
A second theory - less credible - claims that Israel wanted to see whether its warplanes could reach Iran without being spotted by Syrian radar. This was in preparation for an upcoming war that Jerusalem expects between the US and Iran.
A third theory claims that Israel was searching for military training bases for Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. A fourth claims that the operation was nothing more than a provocation aimed at showing the Syrians that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were on alert and had "recovered" from their summer war with Hezbollah last year. The Israelis wanted to see how Syria would respond.
Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Shara, on a state visit to Rome, told the Italian daily La Repubblica, "All I can say is that the military and political echelon is looking into a series of responses as we speak. Results are forthcoming."
When asked what kind of retaliation was expected from the Syrians, he replied: "I cannot reveal details." The journalist then spoke about an appeal from Israeli President Shimon Peres to Syria, to which Shara responded: "Excuse me for smiling. The talks about peace are a disguise for blatant aggression. Israel's responses in light of the aircraft infiltration are amazing, with [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert saying he knows nothing about it."
Other swift responses came from Syria's main allies, Russia, Turkey and Iran. The Turks even summoned Israel's ambassador to Ankara and protested the Israeli aggression. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki contacted his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Mouallem, expressing his country's willingness to stand by Damascus. The Russians said the violation was "unacceptable" and condemned it, while the Turks said they were "worried".
The United States, surprisingly, had no comment on the entire ordeal. What makes the crisis all the more troubling is the Israeli silence. Neither cabinet ministers nor IDF sources, or even the Prime Minister's Office, have commented on the intrusion. They have neither confirmed nor denied it, although in the past Israel trumpets when it performs such an operation, either in Syria or Lebanon. The last time its warplanes ripped through Syrian skies was in June 2006.
Before that, they had hit the Syrian village of Ain al-Saheb, near Damascus, in October 2003. According to the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat, whose Syria correspondent Ibrahim al-Hamidi is a well-informed source on his country's foreign policy, Syria believes that the operation was a "diplomatic and military experiment" to test how Syria would react. The paper adds that Syria's warning to retaliate as it sees fit was "serious, deterring and non-escalating".
The Syrians are aware that Olmert is in a difficult position, imposed on him by the less-than-satisfying results of the Israeli war on Lebanon in July-August 2006. In that war - unlike any other in Israel's history since 1948 - none of the Jewish state's objectives was met. They said they were invading Lebanon to rescue two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah. Today, more than one year later, the two soldiers remain in Hezbollah captivity. Israel said it would crush the Lebanese military group, but Hezbollah remains alive and kicking and, according both to its own reports and to those of Western observers, has managed to rearm itself, with an arsenal that is larger than the one it possessed at the start of the war in July 2006.
Olmert understands all of these difficult realities, and so does the Israeli public, which holds him and his team accountable for the ill-fated Lebanon adventure. With such a defeat on his record, the Israeli prime minister cannot possible talk peace with the Syrians - or anyone else. He needs to obtain his war medals to "right the wrongs" done to his image in Lebanon. Only after waging a war - and either winning or not losing it - can Olmert project himself as a peacemaker.
Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat could not go to Camp David in 1978 without having waged the October war against Israel in 1973. Yitzhak Rabin could not have gone to Oslo in 1993 without having obtained plenty of war medals in every Israeli war since 1948. And the same applies to Olmert. That is why war - rather than peace - is more likely on the prime minister's agenda.
This war would have to be either with Syria or with Hezbollah. In his latest speech before Parliament in May, President Bashar al-Assad said defeated leaders (like Olmert) can do strange things - such as go to war rather than make peace with their neighbors. In a speech in July, Assad re-emphasized his country's willingness for peace, saying: "The most Syria could do is send a Syrian to a neutral place to negotiate with a third party, who in turn would convey Syria's message to the Israelis, who might be staying at another hotel. Direct talks between Syria and Israel are also out of the question at this stage."
The basis of any Syrian cooperation would be the borderline of June 4, 1967. He also asked for guarantees, saying that from experience in the 1990s, Syria does not trust the Israelis. "We did not trust them before the 1990s and now distrust them further." He asked for something similar to the agreement reached with the late Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin, which promised to restore the Golan Heights in full to Syria.
Peace with Syria was initially vetoed by US President George W Bush in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq in 2003, when he said "Syria has to wait" until all other pending issues are solved in the Middle East. That was seconded by both prime minister Ariel Sharon, who was not interested in talks with the Syrians, and his successor, Ehud Olmert.
This lack of interest continued until 2006. Then Israel suddenly seemed to change course with regard to Syria. Public opinion in Israel shifted. Many believe that only Syria can secure Israel's border with Lebanon. Making peace with the Syrians, the Israelis believed, seemed all the more logical since it automatically would mean a calm front with Hezbollah.
Early this year, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz said secret talks had taken place in Europe between Israelis and a private Syrian citizen. In April, US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi went to Damascus with a message to Assad from Olmert. The Israeli press went into a frenzy in revisiting the Syrian-Israeli peace track. The "Syria story" made headlines in the Israeli press, and quotes from Syrian newspapers began appearing in leading Israeli dailies, to monitor Syria's readiness for peace.
One reason for the about-turn was domestic pressure on the Israeli prime minister. His Kadima-Labor cabinet seemed on the verge of collapse. The Winograd Report on the summer war nearly destroyed his career, because its findings implicated some of his top officials in wrongdoings during the Lebanon war of 2006. The premier needed to divert Israeli attention - fast - to steal the limelight from former prime minister Ehud Barak, who was making a political comeback in Israel.
In July, Olmert appeared on Al-Arabiyya TV, addressing the Syrian leader: "Bashar al-Assad, you know that I am ready for direct talks with you. I am ready to sit with you and talk about peace, not war." He added, "I will be happy if I could make peace with Syria. I do not want to wage war against Syria." The US did not seem to mind this change of policy, since it also needed the Syrians to cooperate on two issues: Iraq and Lebanon. Bush would also be interested in a rapprochement with the Syrians, either for dialogue with Iran, via Syria, or to learn more about the Iranians through Damascus.
The Syrians were unimpressed by the Israeli conditions for peace, which included halting Syria's cooperation with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. In response, the Jerusalem Post ran an article on July 11 saying war with Syria was "possible". This coincided with mobilization of the IDF on the Golan border, and reports in Israeli dailies saying that 70% of the army's reservists were taking part in exercises along the Golan.
Israel also declared that one of its famous units, the Golan Brigade, had just completed intensive training in war games. Guy Hazoot, the officer in charge of the 91st Division deployed along the border with Lebanon, noted: "The worst case is war, and we have to be prepared for the worst case."
The Jerusalem Post added that if war were to break out with Syria, it would be many times worse for Israel than its confrontation with Hezbollah in 2006. While all of that was coming out of Israel, raising red alerts, there were also contradicting gestures by Israeli officials.
One came from deputy chief of staff of the IDF, Major-General Moshe Kaplinsky, who said: "I hear the voice, but to the best of our assessment, which is also my personal assessment, we do not expect a war this summer from Syria." Israel's mobilization on the Syrian border was in response to Syrian troop movements, he added, calling it a "defensive" measure.
United Press International, however, quoted "well-informed sources in Washington" saying that a "confrontation between Syria and Israel may happen this summer". This was echoed by Dennis Ross, a Middle East envoy of the era of US president Bill Clinton, who was quoted in the online version of Yediot Aharonot as saying there was a serious "risk" of war between both countries, adding, "The Syrians are positioning themselves for war."
At this stage, all options are on the table, although a political decision for war has not been reached by either country because war would be devastating to the already troubled Middle East.
Israel and the US cannot ignore the fiasco in Iraq. They are unable to predict what the Iranian response would be to an Israeli war with Syria, or how Hezbollah and Hamas would react. The rational center in the US would certainly not allow it - given their stance on troubled Iraq.
Finally, the Israelis are thinking twice about what it means to go to war with Syria. Although sometimes warfare with traditional bulky armies can be easier than with guerrilla groups like Hezbollah, the Syrian army is not an easy one to tackle. It has strong defenses, and a well-built missile system - not just Katyusha rockets - that could cause real pain within Israel.
Officials within the Israeli system say Syria will regret its actions if it goes to war against Israel. The Syrians are saying it is Israel that will suffer from war with Damascus. They seem confident that the myth of the IDF's superiority was shattered by its poor performance against Hezbollah in 2006.
Although they may not win a war with Israel, the Syrians could certainly make Israel suffer. One thing is certain from all the talk coming out of Damascus: the Syrians do not want war.
By Sami Moubayed
Asia Times
On spotting an Israeli warplane in Syrian skies, police personnel would phone their superiors and report its direction, elevation and estimated speed. Army headquarters would immediately call the nearest police station to track it further, then send Syrian warplanes to bring it down or chase it away.
On one such occasion, five Syrian aircraft set out for an operation that included a young pilot, future president Hafez al-Assad. They were prevented from bringing down the Israeli plane, although Assad had it in shooting range, because it was flying over Turkish territory. The same plane violated Syrian airspace later in the day. Another five-plane team set out, and the Israeli jet was downed on the Lebanese border by an officer named Louis Dakar. The pilot ejected, and the co-pilot was killed. When interrogated by the Lebanese, the Israeli pilot said there was a 1% chance of his plane being downed by the Syrians. The fact that they had succeeded meant that the Syrian army was "dangerous" for Israel.
That was 51 years ago.
Last week, four Israeli warplanes invaded Syrian airspace after midnight on September 6, breaking the sound barrier, and reaching as far as the village of Tal Abyad in the vicinity of Deir al-Zour, about 160 kilometers north of the city of Raqqa. A military source in Syria was quoted saying that the Israelis violated Syrian airspace "through the southern border, coming from the Mediterranean front toward the northeastern one".
Syrian defenses confronted the Israeli planes, forcing them to drop their fuel and ammunition so they could fly higher and faster and escape. "We warn the Israeli enemy government against this flagrant aggressive act, and retain the right to respond in an appropriate way," the military spokesman said. Witnesses reported seeing the warplanes at about 1:30am, but thought they were US ones, not Israeli.
The news caused a stir around the world, although it was pretty much expected by observers of the Syrian-Israeli front. There has been much speculation about an outbreak of hostilities between Damascus and Jerusalem since June. Both countries had been mobilizing troops, raising the prospects of war, until Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak came out one week before the military operation saying his country was going to withdraw its troops from the Golan border. Israel captured the Golan Heights in 1967 in the Six Day War and, since then, the countries have been in bitter dispute.
War was not an option, the Israeli minister seemed to be saying. He added that mobilization raised the risk of an "accidental incident" between both armies, something that Jerusalem wanted to avoid. For their part, the Syrians have been saying that their strategic choice is peace - not war - with Israel, reminding the world on every possible occasion that they had engaged in the peace process, under US auspices, for 15 years.
If both countries want peace, as the official version implies, then what exactly happened on September 6? One theory says Israel wanted to test Syrian defenses, especially after reports that Damascus had received new ballistic missiles from Russia. The objectives of the intrusion would be to "feel the waters" before Israel actually engaged in war with the Syrians. This was seconded by Israeli counter-terrorism expert Boaz Ganor, who said his country was "collecting intelligence on long-range missiles" deployed by Syria in the north.
A second theory - less credible - claims that Israel wanted to see whether its warplanes could reach Iran without being spotted by Syrian radar. This was in preparation for an upcoming war that Jerusalem expects between the US and Iran.
A third theory claims that Israel was searching for military training bases for Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. A fourth claims that the operation was nothing more than a provocation aimed at showing the Syrians that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were on alert and had "recovered" from their summer war with Hezbollah last year. The Israelis wanted to see how Syria would respond.
Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Shara, on a state visit to Rome, told the Italian daily La Repubblica, "All I can say is that the military and political echelon is looking into a series of responses as we speak. Results are forthcoming."
When asked what kind of retaliation was expected from the Syrians, he replied: "I cannot reveal details." The journalist then spoke about an appeal from Israeli President Shimon Peres to Syria, to which Shara responded: "Excuse me for smiling. The talks about peace are a disguise for blatant aggression. Israel's responses in light of the aircraft infiltration are amazing, with [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert saying he knows nothing about it."
Other swift responses came from Syria's main allies, Russia, Turkey and Iran. The Turks even summoned Israel's ambassador to Ankara and protested the Israeli aggression. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki contacted his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Mouallem, expressing his country's willingness to stand by Damascus. The Russians said the violation was "unacceptable" and condemned it, while the Turks said they were "worried".
The United States, surprisingly, had no comment on the entire ordeal. What makes the crisis all the more troubling is the Israeli silence. Neither cabinet ministers nor IDF sources, or even the Prime Minister's Office, have commented on the intrusion. They have neither confirmed nor denied it, although in the past Israel trumpets when it performs such an operation, either in Syria or Lebanon. The last time its warplanes ripped through Syrian skies was in June 2006.
Before that, they had hit the Syrian village of Ain al-Saheb, near Damascus, in October 2003. According to the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat, whose Syria correspondent Ibrahim al-Hamidi is a well-informed source on his country's foreign policy, Syria believes that the operation was a "diplomatic and military experiment" to test how Syria would react. The paper adds that Syria's warning to retaliate as it sees fit was "serious, deterring and non-escalating".
The Syrians are aware that Olmert is in a difficult position, imposed on him by the less-than-satisfying results of the Israeli war on Lebanon in July-August 2006. In that war - unlike any other in Israel's history since 1948 - none of the Jewish state's objectives was met. They said they were invading Lebanon to rescue two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah. Today, more than one year later, the two soldiers remain in Hezbollah captivity. Israel said it would crush the Lebanese military group, but Hezbollah remains alive and kicking and, according both to its own reports and to those of Western observers, has managed to rearm itself, with an arsenal that is larger than the one it possessed at the start of the war in July 2006.
Olmert understands all of these difficult realities, and so does the Israeli public, which holds him and his team accountable for the ill-fated Lebanon adventure. With such a defeat on his record, the Israeli prime minister cannot possible talk peace with the Syrians - or anyone else. He needs to obtain his war medals to "right the wrongs" done to his image in Lebanon. Only after waging a war - and either winning or not losing it - can Olmert project himself as a peacemaker.
Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat could not go to Camp David in 1978 without having waged the October war against Israel in 1973. Yitzhak Rabin could not have gone to Oslo in 1993 without having obtained plenty of war medals in every Israeli war since 1948. And the same applies to Olmert. That is why war - rather than peace - is more likely on the prime minister's agenda.
This war would have to be either with Syria or with Hezbollah. In his latest speech before Parliament in May, President Bashar al-Assad said defeated leaders (like Olmert) can do strange things - such as go to war rather than make peace with their neighbors. In a speech in July, Assad re-emphasized his country's willingness for peace, saying: "The most Syria could do is send a Syrian to a neutral place to negotiate with a third party, who in turn would convey Syria's message to the Israelis, who might be staying at another hotel. Direct talks between Syria and Israel are also out of the question at this stage."
The basis of any Syrian cooperation would be the borderline of June 4, 1967. He also asked for guarantees, saying that from experience in the 1990s, Syria does not trust the Israelis. "We did not trust them before the 1990s and now distrust them further." He asked for something similar to the agreement reached with the late Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin, which promised to restore the Golan Heights in full to Syria.
Peace with Syria was initially vetoed by US President George W Bush in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq in 2003, when he said "Syria has to wait" until all other pending issues are solved in the Middle East. That was seconded by both prime minister Ariel Sharon, who was not interested in talks with the Syrians, and his successor, Ehud Olmert.
This lack of interest continued until 2006. Then Israel suddenly seemed to change course with regard to Syria. Public opinion in Israel shifted. Many believe that only Syria can secure Israel's border with Lebanon. Making peace with the Syrians, the Israelis believed, seemed all the more logical since it automatically would mean a calm front with Hezbollah.
Early this year, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz said secret talks had taken place in Europe between Israelis and a private Syrian citizen. In April, US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi went to Damascus with a message to Assad from Olmert. The Israeli press went into a frenzy in revisiting the Syrian-Israeli peace track. The "Syria story" made headlines in the Israeli press, and quotes from Syrian newspapers began appearing in leading Israeli dailies, to monitor Syria's readiness for peace.
One reason for the about-turn was domestic pressure on the Israeli prime minister. His Kadima-Labor cabinet seemed on the verge of collapse. The Winograd Report on the summer war nearly destroyed his career, because its findings implicated some of his top officials in wrongdoings during the Lebanon war of 2006. The premier needed to divert Israeli attention - fast - to steal the limelight from former prime minister Ehud Barak, who was making a political comeback in Israel.
In July, Olmert appeared on Al-Arabiyya TV, addressing the Syrian leader: "Bashar al-Assad, you know that I am ready for direct talks with you. I am ready to sit with you and talk about peace, not war." He added, "I will be happy if I could make peace with Syria. I do not want to wage war against Syria." The US did not seem to mind this change of policy, since it also needed the Syrians to cooperate on two issues: Iraq and Lebanon. Bush would also be interested in a rapprochement with the Syrians, either for dialogue with Iran, via Syria, or to learn more about the Iranians through Damascus.
The Syrians were unimpressed by the Israeli conditions for peace, which included halting Syria's cooperation with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. In response, the Jerusalem Post ran an article on July 11 saying war with Syria was "possible". This coincided with mobilization of the IDF on the Golan border, and reports in Israeli dailies saying that 70% of the army's reservists were taking part in exercises along the Golan.
Israel also declared that one of its famous units, the Golan Brigade, had just completed intensive training in war games. Guy Hazoot, the officer in charge of the 91st Division deployed along the border with Lebanon, noted: "The worst case is war, and we have to be prepared for the worst case."
The Jerusalem Post added that if war were to break out with Syria, it would be many times worse for Israel than its confrontation with Hezbollah in 2006. While all of that was coming out of Israel, raising red alerts, there were also contradicting gestures by Israeli officials.
One came from deputy chief of staff of the IDF, Major-General Moshe Kaplinsky, who said: "I hear the voice, but to the best of our assessment, which is also my personal assessment, we do not expect a war this summer from Syria." Israel's mobilization on the Syrian border was in response to Syrian troop movements, he added, calling it a "defensive" measure.
United Press International, however, quoted "well-informed sources in Washington" saying that a "confrontation between Syria and Israel may happen this summer". This was echoed by Dennis Ross, a Middle East envoy of the era of US president Bill Clinton, who was quoted in the online version of Yediot Aharonot as saying there was a serious "risk" of war between both countries, adding, "The Syrians are positioning themselves for war."
At this stage, all options are on the table, although a political decision for war has not been reached by either country because war would be devastating to the already troubled Middle East.
Israel and the US cannot ignore the fiasco in Iraq. They are unable to predict what the Iranian response would be to an Israeli war with Syria, or how Hezbollah and Hamas would react. The rational center in the US would certainly not allow it - given their stance on troubled Iraq.
Finally, the Israelis are thinking twice about what it means to go to war with Syria. Although sometimes warfare with traditional bulky armies can be easier than with guerrilla groups like Hezbollah, the Syrian army is not an easy one to tackle. It has strong defenses, and a well-built missile system - not just Katyusha rockets - that could cause real pain within Israel.
Officials within the Israeli system say Syria will regret its actions if it goes to war against Israel. The Syrians are saying it is Israel that will suffer from war with Damascus. They seem confident that the myth of the IDF's superiority was shattered by its poor performance against Hezbollah in 2006.
Although they may not win a war with Israel, the Syrians could certainly make Israel suffer. One thing is certain from all the talk coming out of Damascus: the Syrians do not want war.
By Sami Moubayed
Asia Times