Alex
01-02-2008, 08:12 AM
Iran is banking on Russia
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/01/02/10178733.html
01/01/2008 11:09 PM | By Amir Taheri, Special to Gulf News
Is Russia about to plug one of the biggest holes in Iran's military strategy, thus altering the regional balance of power?
Last week, Iran's Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar announced that Moscow has agreed to supply the Islamic Republic with an anti-aircraft defence system equipped with S-300 surface-to-air missiles.
Returning from an official visit to Moscow at the head of a high-level military delegation, Najjar told a press conference in Tehran that contract for the deal will soon be signed.
Two days later, however, the Russian government announced that no deal had been made and that Najjar's declaration had been premature. However, when the deal finally goes through, the Russian-made system could provide the missing piece in the jigsaw that makes the Islamic Republic's strategy in case of a major war.
Tehran has been pressing Russia to sell the missiles since 1996 when the Khomeinist leadership formulated its so-called National Defence Doctrine. The doctrine was based on the assumption that the US and/or Israel would be the Islamic Republic's principal adversaries in a major conflict.
The doctrine based Iran's defence on three pillars: a massive land force with reserves of up to 20 million men, a large arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles, and the scientific and technological "surge capacity" to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Iran has made speedy progress in all three domains.
Each year, an average of 600,000 young men have been trained in warfare under a revised scheme of national service.
With aid from China and North Korea, Iran's missile manufacturing industry has been put into top gear. The Islamic Republic now produces a variety of short, medium and long-range missiles, some designed to carry chemical and/or nuclear warheads to every capital in the Middle East and beyond.
Lastly, Iran has started enriching uranium on an industrial scale, stockpiling the key ingredient for producing weapons' grade material in a short time.
The Iranian defence doctrine assumed that neither the US nor Israel would have the stomach for a long land war in which Iran would be prepared to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of men while its adversaries would shudder at the thought of losing a few thousands.
The doctrine also assumed that Iran's massive arsenal of missiles could be used against a range of targets including US bases and troops in the region and oil installations in countries allied to Washington. Finally, the doctrine assumed that once Iran had a nuclear arsenal, its adversaries would not dare use nuclear weapons against it for fear of retaliation.
The doctrine recognised one major area of weakness: Iran's lack of an effective air force and thus its vulnerability to massive air attacks.
The reason for this is that Iran's air force, built under the Shah, was entirely US-made and equipped. When the mullahs seized power and broke with the US, Iran's air force entered a period of decline from which it never recovered.
Warplanes
Since 1979, Iran has purchased warplanes from North Korea, China, Russia and even Brazil. However, what is left of the Iranian air force is no match for what the US and/or Israel could deploy in a major air campaign.
Last summer the outgoing Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Rahim Safavi, publicly warned that Iran was in no position to protect its skies against "major enemy attacks". Thus Iran remains vulnerable to massive air attacks by the US and/or Israel aimed at destroying its defences even before a war formally begins.
In such a situation Tehran would be left with a Hobson's choice: either escalating the conflict by attacking the United States' weaker allies in the region, which could invite more massive retaliation, as well as loss of support in the region, or swallowing the bitter pill and doing nothing, in which case the survival of the regime could be in question. Therefore, Iran needs a system enabling it to make air attacks against it as costly and as ineffective as possible.
It is precisely such a system that Russia appears to have agreed to install in Iran, dramatically raising Iran's war-making capacities. The provision of S-300 missiles by Russia would be a political coup for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
His two predecessors, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, both mullahs, had worked hard but failed to persuade Moscow to make a move that could alter the strategic balance in a region of vital importance to the US and the European Union.
The first sign that Moscow was changing its policy came last year when Ahmadinejad succeeded in signing a $1 billion contract for the purchase of TOR-M1 missiles. These are short-range missiles for use against low flying aircraft attacking ground forces, but would be of little effect against high-flying heavy bombers.
This is why Ahmadinejad, backed by the newly created Defence Policy Planning Commission, decided to press Moscow for S-300s. The new system could take three years to install and will cost Tehran $2.2 billion, a sum that Iran can afford thanks to current crude oil prices.
Why did Putin decide to reverse a policy pursued by Russia for over a decade?
Mild reaction
One reason is the unexpectedly mild reaction of Washington to the sale of TOR-M1 missiles to Iran last year. It is possible that Putin used that contact to test the US resolve to prevent Iran from upgrading its war-making capacities.
Another reason may be Putin's belief that the US has lost the will to resist Iran's agenda for the Middle East, and thus believes it is in Russia's interest to remain close to Tehran in order to temper its ambitions. The view in Moscow's foreign policy circles is that, once President George W. Bush is out of office, the US would be looking for ways of reducing its presence in the Middle East rather than trying to shape its future.
Finally, the Iranian contract would be the biggest signed by the Russian armament industry with a foreign power since the fall of the USSR. If finalised, it could help realise Putin's ambition to regain Moscow's former position as a major exporter of military hardware on the global market.
Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/01/02/10178733.html
01/01/2008 11:09 PM | By Amir Taheri, Special to Gulf News
Is Russia about to plug one of the biggest holes in Iran's military strategy, thus altering the regional balance of power?
Last week, Iran's Defence Minister Mustafa Najjar announced that Moscow has agreed to supply the Islamic Republic with an anti-aircraft defence system equipped with S-300 surface-to-air missiles.
Returning from an official visit to Moscow at the head of a high-level military delegation, Najjar told a press conference in Tehran that contract for the deal will soon be signed.
Two days later, however, the Russian government announced that no deal had been made and that Najjar's declaration had been premature. However, when the deal finally goes through, the Russian-made system could provide the missing piece in the jigsaw that makes the Islamic Republic's strategy in case of a major war.
Tehran has been pressing Russia to sell the missiles since 1996 when the Khomeinist leadership formulated its so-called National Defence Doctrine. The doctrine was based on the assumption that the US and/or Israel would be the Islamic Republic's principal adversaries in a major conflict.
The doctrine based Iran's defence on three pillars: a massive land force with reserves of up to 20 million men, a large arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles, and the scientific and technological "surge capacity" to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Iran has made speedy progress in all three domains.
Each year, an average of 600,000 young men have been trained in warfare under a revised scheme of national service.
With aid from China and North Korea, Iran's missile manufacturing industry has been put into top gear. The Islamic Republic now produces a variety of short, medium and long-range missiles, some designed to carry chemical and/or nuclear warheads to every capital in the Middle East and beyond.
Lastly, Iran has started enriching uranium on an industrial scale, stockpiling the key ingredient for producing weapons' grade material in a short time.
The Iranian defence doctrine assumed that neither the US nor Israel would have the stomach for a long land war in which Iran would be prepared to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of men while its adversaries would shudder at the thought of losing a few thousands.
The doctrine also assumed that Iran's massive arsenal of missiles could be used against a range of targets including US bases and troops in the region and oil installations in countries allied to Washington. Finally, the doctrine assumed that once Iran had a nuclear arsenal, its adversaries would not dare use nuclear weapons against it for fear of retaliation.
The doctrine recognised one major area of weakness: Iran's lack of an effective air force and thus its vulnerability to massive air attacks.
The reason for this is that Iran's air force, built under the Shah, was entirely US-made and equipped. When the mullahs seized power and broke with the US, Iran's air force entered a period of decline from which it never recovered.
Warplanes
Since 1979, Iran has purchased warplanes from North Korea, China, Russia and even Brazil. However, what is left of the Iranian air force is no match for what the US and/or Israel could deploy in a major air campaign.
Last summer the outgoing Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Rahim Safavi, publicly warned that Iran was in no position to protect its skies against "major enemy attacks". Thus Iran remains vulnerable to massive air attacks by the US and/or Israel aimed at destroying its defences even before a war formally begins.
In such a situation Tehran would be left with a Hobson's choice: either escalating the conflict by attacking the United States' weaker allies in the region, which could invite more massive retaliation, as well as loss of support in the region, or swallowing the bitter pill and doing nothing, in which case the survival of the regime could be in question. Therefore, Iran needs a system enabling it to make air attacks against it as costly and as ineffective as possible.
It is precisely such a system that Russia appears to have agreed to install in Iran, dramatically raising Iran's war-making capacities. The provision of S-300 missiles by Russia would be a political coup for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
His two predecessors, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, both mullahs, had worked hard but failed to persuade Moscow to make a move that could alter the strategic balance in a region of vital importance to the US and the European Union.
The first sign that Moscow was changing its policy came last year when Ahmadinejad succeeded in signing a $1 billion contract for the purchase of TOR-M1 missiles. These are short-range missiles for use against low flying aircraft attacking ground forces, but would be of little effect against high-flying heavy bombers.
This is why Ahmadinejad, backed by the newly created Defence Policy Planning Commission, decided to press Moscow for S-300s. The new system could take three years to install and will cost Tehran $2.2 billion, a sum that Iran can afford thanks to current crude oil prices.
Why did Putin decide to reverse a policy pursued by Russia for over a decade?
Mild reaction
One reason is the unexpectedly mild reaction of Washington to the sale of TOR-M1 missiles to Iran last year. It is possible that Putin used that contact to test the US resolve to prevent Iran from upgrading its war-making capacities.
Another reason may be Putin's belief that the US has lost the will to resist Iran's agenda for the Middle East, and thus believes it is in Russia's interest to remain close to Tehran in order to temper its ambitions. The view in Moscow's foreign policy circles is that, once President George W. Bush is out of office, the US would be looking for ways of reducing its presence in the Middle East rather than trying to shape its future.
Finally, the Iranian contract would be the biggest signed by the Russian armament industry with a foreign power since the fall of the USSR. If finalised, it could help realise Putin's ambition to regain Moscow's former position as a major exporter of military hardware on the global market.
Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.